Was the Munich Agreement Good or Badadmin
Under the Munich Accords, the entire predominantly German territory in Czechoslovakia had to be handed over by 10 October. Poland and Hungary occupied other parts of the country and after a few months, Czechoslovakia ceased to exist and what remained of Slovakia became a German puppet state. Later in the session, a pre-arranged deception was undertaken to influence and pressure Chamberlain: one of Hitler`s assistants entered the room to inform Hitler of the other Germans killed in Czechoslovakia, to which Hitler shouted in response: “I will avenge each of them. The Czechs must be annihilated.  The meeting ended with Hitler`s refusal to make concessions to the Allies` demands.  Later that evening, Hitler worried that he had gone too far to put pressure on Chamberlain and called the suite of Chamberlain`s hotel and said he would agree to annex only the Sudetenland, with no plans for other areas, provided that Czechoslovakia began evacuating ethnic Czechs from the territories of the German majority by September 26 at 8:00 a.m. .m. After pressure from Chamberlain, Hitler agreed to set the ultimatum for October 1 (the same date on which Operation Green was to begin).  Hitler then told Chamberlain that this was a concession he was willing to give to the prime minister as a “gift,” out of respect for the fact that Chamberlain had been willing to give up his previous position somewhat.  Hitler went on to say that if the Sudetenland were annexed, Germany would no longer have territorial claims over Czechoslovakia and would conclude a collective agreement to guarantee the borders of Germany and Czechoslovakia.  But Munich quickly became a symbol of the dangers of appeasing aggressive governments.
The agreement dissolved and Hitler conquered the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, a decisive step on the road to World War II. Today, Munich occupies a place in the popular imagination as the moment when an opportunity was missed to mobilize resistance against Hitler, and an example of the folly of trusting the unscrupulous. Since then, the Munich Accords have been a powerful lesson for diplomats: if a hostile foreign power has no interest in peace or compromise, trying to appease that will do more harm than good. Have John Kerry, William Hague and the other authors of the Iran deal forgotten this lesson? Fifty years ago, Neville Chamberlain got off his plane, gesticulated with his umbrella and told his worried compatriots that the pathetic capitulation he had just signed in Munich would assure them of what the prayer book advocates, “peace in our time.” The main effect of his act was to give umbrellas and peace a bad reputation for generations to come. In less than a year, the world was at war, while the Munich Accords went down in history as proof of the futility of concessions and the virtues of uncompromising force. His “lesson” has since been cited to justify causes as diverse as the US intervention in Vietnam, the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and opposition to arms control agreements. Nor would I be surprised if Soviet strategists behind the Kremlin`s secret walls invoked this lesson to oppose a withdrawal from Afghanistan, Poland or Hungary and seriously warn against “another Munich.” After Tehran received the bomb, Saudi Arabia would likely do the same, leading to an extremely destabilizing arms race in the region. If the West really wants to prevent this, it must offer Iran what it longs for: security against foreign intervention. The Geneva Convention is a major step in this direction. By signing the deal, the US has shown that it accepts the Iranian regime – albeit reluctantly – and does not seek its violent overthrow or strike on its nuclear facilities. On the 29th. In September, Chamberlain rushed to Munich to meet Hitler for the third – and last – time, and entered a 14-hour trial that ended in the middle of the night.
According to the agreement, the German-speaking regions of the Sudetenland were to be incorporated into the Reich and an international commission was to oversee referendums elsewhere along the border. Chamberlain and Hitler also signed the Anglo-German Declaration, in which they “reaffirmed the desire of our two peoples never to go to war again.” The Prime Minister returned home as a national hero. In the spring of 1938, Hitler openly began to support the demands of the German-speaking people of the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia for closer relations with Germany. Hitler had recently annexed Austria to Germany, and the conquest of Czechoslovakia was the next step in his plan to create a “Greater Germany.” The Czechoslovak government hoped that Britain and France would come to the rescue in the event of a German invasion, but British Prime Minister Chamberlain was anxious to avoid war. He made two trips to Germany in September and offered Hitler favorable deals, but the Führer continued to increase his demands. Halifax argued that if the Czechs decided to resist Germany, Britain and France would have to fight with them. His position was probably more rooted in politics—fear of how the government was perceived at home—than in the strategic disagreement with Chamberlain. He believed that a confrontation between Germany and the Soviet Union was looming in Eastern Europe, from which Britain should abstain.
But now he has declared that “the ultimate goal” of politics should be the “destruction of National Socialism.” Cynics saw this as rather opportunistic. One of Chamberlain`s friends concluded that Halifax possessed “eel qualities” and a capacity for “sublime betrayal.” However, it was a climate in which several ministers were considering resigning, and backbenchers, including Churchill and another future prime minister, Harold Macmillan, were preparing to push for a new government when “Chamberlain rat again.” On September 22, Chamberlain, who was about to board his plane to go to Bad Godesberg in Germany for further discussions, told the press that met him there: “My goal is peace in Europe, I hope this journey is the path to that peace.” Chamberlain arrived in Cologne, where he was generously received with a German band playing “God Save the King” and Germans giving flowers and gifts to Chamberlain.  Chamberlain had calculated that full acceptance of the German annexation of all sudetenland without reductions would force Hitler to accept the agreement.  When Hitler learned of this, he replied, “Does this mean that the Allies accepted Prague`s consent to the surrender of the Sudetenland to Germany?” Chamberlain replied, “Exactly,” to which Hitler responded by shaking his head, saying that the Allied offer was insufficient. He told Chamberlain that he wanted Czechoslovakia completely dissolved and its territories redistributed to Germany, Poland, and Hungary, and told Chamberlain to take it or leave it.  Chamberlain was shocked by this statement.  Hitler went on to tell Chamberlain that since their last meeting on September 15, they had met. Czechoslovakia`s actions, which Hitler said involved the murder of Germans, had made the situation unbearable for Germany.  The agreement allowing the annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany was signed on September 29, 1938. The Prime Minister`s spectacular triumph proved short-lived. Within a few weeks, the colony of Munich dissolved.
Referendums never took place and Hitler simply seized the disputed territories. Some had predicted it from the beginning. In fact, Halifax offered little resounding support to Munich when he publicly called the agreement “the best heinous election of evil.” Churchill predicted, “This is just the beginning of the count.” July 29 and 30. In September 1938, an emergency meeting of the major European powers is held in Munich, excluding Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union, allied with France and Czechoslovakia. On Hitler`s terms, an agreement was quickly reached. It was signed by the leaders of Germany, France, Britain and Italy. Militarily, the Sudetenland was of strategic importance to Czechoslovakia, as most of its border defenses were located there to protect themselves from a German attack. The agreement between the four powers was signed in the context of an undeclared german-Czechoslovak war of low intensity, which had begun on September 17, 1938. Meanwhile, after September 23, 1938, Poland moved its army units to its common border with Czechoslovakia.  Czechoslovakia yielded to diplomatic pressure from France and Britain and agreed on September 30 to cede territories to Germany on Munich terms. Fearing the possible loss of Zaolzie to Germany, Poland issued Zaolzie with an ultimatum with a majority of ethnic Poles that Germany had accepted in advance and that Czechoslovakia had accepted on 1 October. .
The solution to the Czechoslovak problem, which has now been found, is, in my opinion, only the prelude to a broader settlement in which the whole of Europe can find peace. .